Below is a report from Stratfor, part of the lucrative terrorism industry. The report exemplifies the self-serving nature of commentary emanating from self-styled "Terrorism Experts".
It relates a tale of "a four-month FBI investigation and
sting operation, during which undercover agents had been communicating
with Daoud [a suspect now under arrest] and recording his statements. Sting operations", it notes, "have become
the tactic of choice for the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement
organizations when investigating would-be jihadists."
Note that the suspect was arrested only five days earlier, so any criminal proceedings are well in the future. Like the British satirical magazine Private Eye which recently disgraced itself by imputing guilt to Julian Assange on its front cover, Stratfor is willing to publish prejudicial matter about ongoing criminal investigations. Where they are getting their narrative from is unclear, but we can be pretty sure it isn't the defendant.
The report seems to be based on the premise that the FBI's conduct here - and in all the other similar cases - is unproblematic. The defence of entrapment is treated, in true Dirty Harry style, as one of those pesky 'technicalities', an obstacle to be overcome by ticking the right boxes.
The law of entrapment is of course rather complex, and in the US favours the authorities rather more than one might suppose natural justice would permit. But two things can be said with some certainty: first, the author of this piece is quite wrong to suppose that 'coercion' is necessary for entrapment - it's not entirely clear that he even knows what the word means. And second, whatever the exact legal position in the relevant jurisdiction, this case and a fair number of others like it, stinks.
The article states that "Daoud was a typical aspirational jihadist" - yes, of course he was, since 'aspirational jihadist' here means no more than 'the kind of loudmouthed showoff that is likely to attract the attention of FBI provocateurs'. There are a number of vague and uncheckable allegations which appear to have been fed to the author by the authorities, such as that Mr Loudmouth had attempted to 'recruit' a number of people to help him plot some kind of attack - we have no idea what this amounted to, except that he did not in fact actually recruit anyone for anything until he 'crossed paths' with an FBI provocateur - at which point the issue of who recruited whom becomes an interesting and open question.
"By himself," we are told - and he was by himself - "Daoud was still a long way from posing a direct threat to
the United States". Some of the commentary has an air of parody - "One of the
characteristics of dramatic attacks of the sort Daoud envisioned, ['envisioned']
however, is that they are difficult to execute alone -- especially if
the individual doesn't know how to make explosives or a bomb." Yes, I should say so. The author continues: "Early in Daoud's planning, [so 'early in his planning' that there wasn't any plan at all, it seems] he saw it necessary to reach out for help, which helped to tip off law enforcement agents." Yes, to tip off law enforcement agents that here might be a clueless idiot who, given sufficient encouragement, assistance and coaching might provide them with a terrorism conviction.
The author notes that the FBI rejected the option of "immediately arresting Daoud and making a weak case to a
federal judge based on an 18-year-old's online rants". Yes, I bet they did. Instead, "investigators
continued to monitor Daoud, seeking more evidence to make a stronger
case and get a more severe sentence." Or indeed, one might suppose just to make sure that he was as much of a joker as he appeared, and wouldn't be recruited by someone who actually had a plan or some expertise? No - quite the opposite, it seems. Not satisfied with monitoring this character, "the FBI set up a sting operation,
during which authorities recorded Daoud plotting an attack with an
undercover law enforcement agent." Not with anyone else, just this undercover agent provocateur.
"In a textbook sting operation targeting an aspiring jihadist, an
undercover agent offers the suspect an explosive device (or other deadly
weapon). As soon as the suspect attempts to use the inert explosive
device, authorities have all the evidence they need to charge the
suspect with attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction. The FBI has
conducted dozens of these sting operations, where it finds an individual
who self-identifies as an aspiring jihadist and then uses informants or
undercover agents to collect more evidence against the suspect. Many of
those put on trial have received 20- to 30-year sentences."
Having laid out this 'textbook' model of gaining terrorism convictions (which will of course be cited by political and media hacks, spooks and 'terrorism experts' as real and serious disrupted plots, of course), even this author seems to realise it may be necessary to allay some obvious concerns about the usefulness and justice of this approach:
"While the government's pursuit of an incompetent, would-be jihadist
may seem extreme, individuals like Daoud (known in some law enforcement
circles as "Kramer jihadists," after the bumbling character from
Seinfeld)
have posed a threat before when they have linked up with competent
jihadist operatives. For example, the FBI conducted surveillance on the
group that would conduct the 1993 World Trade Center attack but dropped
the investigation when the informant turned out to be problematic and
when it was determined that the group did not possess the skills to pose
a threat."
Er, let me stop you there, Ben. You say that the FBI dropped the investigation? I think you must mean 'discontinued their surveillance'. So that would appear to be the problem there wouldn't it. The FBI stopped watching people they had identified as potential future recruits. |So what you should be recommending is that the FBI should have continued keeping any eye on the suspects - who by your own account would then have led them to some actual terrorist recruiters. Of course that would also require that these bozos had not already been put away for some fake crime entirely manufactured by the FBI, wouldn't it.
Aspiring Jihadist Arrested in Chicago
September 20, 2012 | 0900 GMT
By Ben West
On the evening of Sept. 15, Adel Daoud parked a Jeep Cherokee loaded
with a large explosive device outside a bar in downtown Chicago. As he
walked down the street away from the vehicle, he activated a trigger to
detonate the bomb. The bomb, however, was inert, and FBI agents
positioned nearby immediately took Daoud, an 18-year-old from the
Chicago suburbs, into custody.
Daoud had been the subject of a four-month FBI investigation and
sting operation, during which undercover agents had been communicating
with Daoud and recording his statements. Sting operations have become
the tactic of choice for the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement
organizations when investigating would-be jihadists. As U.S. law
enforcement agencies perfect their sting operations to identify aspiring
jihadists and prevent attacks, jihadists, too, can be expected to
innovate and evolve alternate means of communication and vetting of
those with whom they collaborate.
Details of Daoud's Case
Daoud was a typical aspirational jihadist. He read Inspire magazine (an online jihadist publication), watched jihadist training videos, cited arguments from the late Anwar al-Awlaki,
participated in jihadist forums denouncing U.S. policy and justified
attacks against U.S. citizens. He was not shy in voicing his intent to
kill Americans in retaliation for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Daoud tried to recruit at least six people over the span of seven
months to help plot an attack against the United States before he
crossed paths with an undercover agent on the Internet around May
2012. Based on records later obtained by investigators, Daoud did not
appear to have any hard skills to conduct a bombing attack. He
downloaded several instructional documents and videos on how to make
explosives and build bombs, but there is no indication that Daoud
attempted to make any weapons himself. Instead, he talked about going to
Saudi Arabia or fighting in Yemen, although he expressed a desire to
conduct attacks in the United States before going abroad.
By himself, Daoud was still a long way from posing a direct threat to
the United States, but he was bent on conducting an attack. Along the
way, he made a number of mistakes. For one, it is apparent from Daoud's
conversations with the undercover agent, documented in the Sept. 15
criminal complaint, that Daoud did not heed all of the advice that he
read in Inspire magazine. Over the years, Inspire has emphasized that
big, elaborate attacks are risky, expensive and hard to put together.
One of the magazine's main contributors, Nasir al-Wahayshi, has argued
that small, simpler attacks such as the Fort Hood shooting in 2009
are much easier to execute, are more effective than bombings and do not
open up aspiring jihadists to discovery by the authorities during the
planning stage.
Daoud unequivocally rejected the idea of a shooting attack, even
mocking the July 20 shooting that killed 12 people at a movie theater in
Aurora, Colo. Daoud insisted on carrying out a spectacular attack,
killing "a lot of enemies" and making headlines worldwide. One of the
characteristics of dramatic attacks of the sort Daoud envisioned,
however, is that they are difficult to execute alone -- especially if
the individual doesn't know how to make explosives or a bomb. Early in Daoud's planning, he saw it necessary to reach out for help, which helped to tip off law enforcement agents.
Rather than immediately arresting Daoud and making a weak case to a
federal judge based on an 18-year-old's online rants, investigators
continued to monitor Daoud, seeking more evidence to make a stronger
case and get a more severe sentence. The FBI set up a sting operation,
during which authorities recorded Daoud plotting an attack with an
undercover law enforcement agent. The FBI also watched Daoud conduct surveillance on the bar he intended to attack.
In a textbook sting operation targeting an aspiring jihadist, an
undercover agent offers the suspect an explosive device (or other deadly
weapon). As soon as the suspect attempts to use the inert explosive
device, authorities have all the evidence they need to charge the
suspect with attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction. The FBI has
conducted dozens of these sting operations, where it finds an individual
who self-identifies as an aspiring jihadist and then uses informants or
undercover agents to collect more evidence against the suspect. Many of
those put on trial have received 20- to 30-year sentences.
While the government's pursuit of an incompetent, would-be jihadist
may seem extreme, individuals like Daoud (known in some law enforcement
circles as "Kramer jihadists," after the bumbling character from Seinfeld)
have posed a threat before when they have linked up with competent
jihadist operatives. For example, the FBI conducted surveillance on the
group that would conduct the 1993 World Trade Center attack but dropped
the investigation when the informant turned out to be problematic and
when it was determined that the group did not possess the skills to pose
a threat. Later, the group met Omar Abdel-Rahman (also known as the Blind Sheikh), who arranged for competent jihadist operatives -- Abdul Basit (also known as Ramzi Yousef) and his partner, Ahmed Ajaj
-- to come in and lead the group of amateur jihadists. Under the
leadership of Basit, the group transformed into the terrorist cell that
successfully attacked the World Trade Center.
Other jihadist operatives, such as Richard Reid and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, were similarly incompetent but became dangerous when competent bombmakers and operatives
exploited their willingness to conduct jihad. Given these past
failures, U.S. counterterrorism officials have no appetite for letting
aspiring jihadists slip through the cracks just because they appear
incompetent on the surface.
Pre-Empting Entrapment
With the investigation under way, the FBI initiated its efforts to
dispel any inklings of coercion. Defense attorneys, civil rights groups
and some in the media have alleged that FBI sting operations targeting
aspiring jihadists are entrapment -- where law enforcement agents coerce
an individual who would not otherwise have posed a threat into an
illegal act. The FBI's handling of Daoud's case shows that it is taking
steps to combat these charges.
Several times during recorded conversations, the FBI undercover agent
gave Daoud opportunities to back away from his planned attack. The
agent cited Ramadan as a reason to delay the attack and further delayed
by fabricating excuses, such as needing to wait for approval from his
sheikh. On at least two occasions, the undercover agent directly asked
Daoud if he was sure he wanted to carry out his attack. The agent
emphasized that Daoud had to have jihad in his heart in order to carry
out a justified attack. He stressed that Daoud couldn't be pressured
into the attack, that he had to be completely self-motivated to execute
it. Any outside help would be just that -- help, not coercion.
As stated above, this step was likely included deliberately.
Entrapment has been raised as a possible defense in the upcoming trial
of Mohamed Mohamud, the 21-year-old Somali-born American accused of attempting to bomb a Christmas ceremony in Portland, Ore.,
in November 2010. Even though the entrapment defense hasn't proved to
be successful, to avoid a recurrence of this defense in Daoud's case,
the undercover agent cleverly used jihadist principles to get Daoud to
emphatically show that he wanted to commit an attack himself and that
nobody was forcing him to do it.
Recordings of these conversations will
make for a more solid case when prosecutors put Daoud on trial in the
coming weeks or months.
The Effectiveness of the Sting
U.S. law enforcement agencies have been extremely active with these
types of jihadist sting operations, especially in the past three years.
While most of the suspects that the stings involve do not appear to pose a serious threat at the outset, aspiring jihadists can be dangerous if they encounter the right people with the right tradecraft.
In addition to being an effective law enforcement tactic, sting
operations also threaten the integrity of jihadists' communication
channels. Such operations will increasingly make aspiring jihadists
skeptical of the person to whom they are speaking. In Daoud's case, he
told the undercover agent that one of his contacts thought he was
talking to a spy. Daoud's sheikh, who was not aware of the planned
attack, also repeatedly discouraged him from talking about jihad and
violence. Others around him knew the risk of discussing plans of attack,
but Daoud persisted due to his inexperience.
U.S. law enforcement's struggle with aspiring jihadists will be a
drawn-out affair, punctuated by action and counteraction. The FBI and
other U.S. agencies are refining their skills in sting operations, which
have proved to be an effective tool for pre-empting terrorist attacks.
The success of these stings will plant doubts in aspiring jihadists'
minds about who they can trust, further complicating their efforts to
conduct dramatic attacks. Now the onus is on the jihadists to adjust.
They can be expected to implement alternate methods of communication and
to step up efforts to verify one another's identities to avoid
detection and arrest.
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