tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post3976380775947671116..comments2023-10-18T17:03:47.698+01:00Comments on Surely some mistake?: Book review: The Transparent Cabal by Stephen SniegoskiTim Wilkinsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15237522140184882034noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-14887395287574819562010-08-29T02:56:30.914+01:002010-08-29T02:56:30.914+01:00Perhaps I am missing something here, but I did not...Perhaps I am missing something here, but I did not see that Mr. Wilkinson’s most recent post added anything new to the discussion. A pro-war coalition seems to be implied but no real coalition is described. So Mr. Wilkinson seems to be talking about Cheney’s motivation for war. But there is nothing that Cheney said about oil that implies war. Instead, what he says seems self-evident. In the near future, the world will be using more oil. The greatest oil reserves are in the Middle East. The US must have access to this source of oil. The oil men such as the Elder Bush, Jim Baker, and Brent Scowcroft were either cool or opposed the war on Iraq but would have uttered the same conventional wisdom. The exact same views were also held by the traditional foreign policy establishment and the national security/foreign policy bureaucracy. <br /><br />As I pointed out in an earlier posting Cheney explicitly expressed other reasons for war, which can be boiled down to Iraq being an actual military threat to the US. (March 8, First Post). In contrast, he does not explicitly give oil as a reason for war. Moreover, access to Gulf Oil would not be an obvious reason to go to war since many oil people and foreign policy experts use the oil issue as a fundamental reason for the US to avoid war. This is especially the case in the discussion of a US bombing attack on Iran, which according to the conventional wisdom would, for the short term, reduce American access to Gulf Oil and wreck havoc with the economies of the industrialized nations. Nor is it apparent that bombing Iran would somehow enhance US access to Iranian oil in the long-term. The ending of US sanctions on Iran, however, would provide the US with such access. Cheney, however, in line with the neocons, supported the bombing of Iran. <br /><br />But why is it even necessary to posit that Cheney’s support for war in the Middle East is due to oil, since Cheney’s close ties to the neocons—which include his membership in such leading neocon groups as JINSA and PNAC, and his wife’s job at AEI--would be sufficient to explain his support for the neocon agenda when he became vice-president. Significantly, he brought his neocon associates, whom he knew would try to implement the Middle East war agenda, into the Bush administration. <br /><br />According to Occam's Razor there is no need to add additional explanations if one suffices. So it seems that Cheney's neocon connections would completely account for his support for a US war policy in the Middle East. That the neocons were the driving force for war does not mean that support from other groups was unnecessary. I go over these supportive groups in my book. Oil, however, was not one of them.Stephen Sniegoskihttp://hectorpv@comcast.netnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-57929166561981744702010-08-19T14:19:33.229+01:002010-08-19T14:19:33.229+01:00Re: Cheney, peak oil:
A bit late, but I've ju...Re: Cheney, peak oil:<br /><br />A bit late, but I've just tracked down this paper which I'd read without retaining any notes, a copy or a link: <a href="http://www.peakoil.net/Publications/Cheney_PeakOil_FCD.pdf" rel="nofollow">Dick Cheney, Peak Oil and the Final Count Down</a>. <br /><br />It's obviously suggestive rather than conclusive, but gives some indication of Cheney's concerns in the time immediately preceding the events of Sep 11 2001. It refers to Cheney's <a href="http://www.energybulletin.net/node/559" rel="nofollow">speech</a> to the Institute of Petroleum in 1999.<br /><br />Quick and very general musings about \explanation of strategic action: <br /><br />Often an explanation which involves a combination of multiple independent factors seems weaker than a simple, unitary explanation. This is partly because it has a scattergun aspect, like a lawyer arguing in the alternative, and when many parallel arguments are put forward the suspicion is that none of them is adequate. <br /><br />In attributing motives, especially to expert (or at least professional) strategists, this view has little force. Killing two or more birds with one stone is an excellent strategy, so one would expect competent planners who have a range of options at their disposal to opt for this kind of leveraging of impact. Concealing or obscuring motive is itself an important strategic aim which is furthered by adopting this kind of ambiguous course of action. <br /><br />Where a coalition of actors is required to effect large-scale action, one would of course also expect all of the constituent groups' disparate interests to be represented in the resulting plans.Tim Wilkinsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15237522140184882034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-86489939069523932912010-03-08T11:17:03.161+00:002010-03-08T11:17:03.161+00:00When I point out that the US oil interests do not ...When I point out that the US oil interests do not currently control oil, Mr. Wilkinson writes: “2. Subsequent events may not be a good guide to past expectations: the adventure may not have turned out well for US oil interests, but that wasn't necessarily foreseen by Cheney et al.” However, as I point out in my book, there was no evidence that the US ever tried to establish the tight control of Iraq that would be necessary to prevent an Iraqi government from following its own economic interests, which probably would not involve giving the US any type of oil monopoly. To this, Mr. Wilkinson responds that “poor planning is not necessarily a sign of lack of intent.” However, historians (or political commentators) can’t determine intent except through actions or documents. Since there were no plans to control oil, it would be allowable to infer the goal from the results, though this could be questioned. In the case of Iraq neither planning nor results back the oil control claim. It would seem that Mr. Wilkinson is just positing the existence of the oil control motive and then not allowing any way of disproving it. In other words, he is assuming a hypothesis to be true (or likely to be true) without providing proof or allowing falsificationStephen Sniegoskihttp://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-20672372321957876372010-03-08T03:00:17.533+00:002010-03-08T03:00:17.533+00:00So when one says oil, one is only talking about Ch...So when one says oil, one is only talking about Cheney’s view not about a consensus opinion of the American foreign policy establishment. Certainly the advocates of this oil view, such as Chomsky, hold the latter view. Cheney supported a war on Iran even though the consensus of expert opinion is that any attack on Iran would cause the price of oil to skyrocket and do serious damage to the US economy and that this represents a fundamental reason NOT to attach Iran. Maybe Cheney really believes war would help the US economy. But why single out Cheney’s alleged views on oil as his true beliefs; why not include his other views as well. His biographer, Barton Gellman (“Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency”) claims that Cheney truly believed the US was actually threatened by Middle East countries (which just happened to be the enemies of Israel). So when referring to Cheney’s ideas one should add the idea that the US was threatened by a future nuclear attack, unmanned aerial vehicles spreading poisonous gas, and other phantasmagorical dangers that Cheney seemed to consider as real—he expressed these ideas far more often than a belief in “peak oil,” which I am not aware of him mentioning.. Thus, to avoid confusion, instead of claiming a oil reason for war, it would be more accurate to say that Cheney believed that a war on Iraq and on Iran would be good for the United States. The same can probably be said for the Jewish neocons. And Cheney as a member of advisory board of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), which has as its purpose the enhancement of the security of Israel, is (by his overt actions) like the neocons in his concern for the national interest of Israel.Stephen Sniegoskihttp://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-31044546091454691682010-03-07T16:42:09.461+00:002010-03-07T16:42:09.461+00:00I'm not sure I have much to add, but FWIW my (...I'm not sure I have much to add, but FWIW my (sorry, rather rushed) response would be:<br /><br />1. There is a distinction (albeit often blurred when convenient) between the short-medium term perceived interests of the oil companies and the US national strategic interest in oil - something that Cheney gave every appearance of being genuinely concerned with.<br /><br />2. Subsequent events may not be a good guide to past expectations: the adventure may not have turned out well for US oil interests, but that wasn't necessarily foreseen by Cheney et al.<br /><br />3. The intention in choosing Iraq (which wasn't necessarily the first choice of the Israel-first neocons) may have been the longer-term strategy of establishing military bases in the country in the expectation that subsequent military operations might be necessary (Cheney took peak oil seriously, it seems, and resource wars are a significant possibility in the medium-long term.)<br /><br />4. I wouldn't rule out the threat to dollar hegemony posed by Saddam's switch to the Euro as at least a triggering event. If the dollar were abandoned as the predominant (until recently, the only) oil trading currency, the consequences for US solvency could be catastrophic, if I understand the position correctly.Tim Wilkinsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15237522140184882034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7976093824276931409.post-62454390880482853632010-03-04T11:10:14.202+00:002010-03-04T11:10:14.202+00:00I appreciate very much Tim Wilkinson’s favorable r...I appreciate very much Tim Wilkinson’s favorable review of my book, which knowledgeably covers its subject matter. I would like to take issue with some comments he made on the issue of oil, however.<br /><br />Although Mr. Wilkinson does not dispute the importance of the neocons in bringing about the war on Iraq, he still continues to concur with elements of the oil-for-war thesis and disagrees with my efforts to show otherwise. While I acknowledge that there were auxiliary groups (e.g., the Christian Right) that were important in the move toward war with Iraq, I deny that, on balance, the oil interest played a pro-war role. In fact, I show that individuals connected with oil, such as the elder Bush and his cronies (e.g., Brent Scowcroft and James Baker), were cool toward or opposed to the war on Iraq and the continued occupation. In fact, it would seem that the individuals tied to oil were very much concerned that the destabilizing aspects of war would be harmful to oil production, and, in fact, harmful to the economies of the US and the industrial world. <br /><br />When I point out that the oil companies in 2001 opposed economic sanctions on Iraq so as to do business with that country, Mr. Wilkinson writes that “the significance of the push for lifting of sanctions is doubtful – after all, lifting sanctions is one way of getting hold of Iraqi oil, regime change another.” But the dubious claim was not getting hold of oil per se (e.g., negotiating oil field business deals with the Iraqi government), but rather pushing for a U.S. war on Iraq to get hold of oil. <br /><br />While I point out that the US never made plans to dominate Iraq to the extent that would be necessary to control its oil for the geostrategic and military benefit of the US, at the expense of Iraq’s economic interests, Mr. Wilkinson writes: “More importantly, US strategic interests are advanced by having guaranteed access to Iraqi oil, without necessarily having total control over every aspect of the Iraqi oil industry. But most significantly, the US administration have succeeded in to installing a very friendly government, as well as establishing a permanent fortified military presence throughout the country – a crude but effective form of influence.” The “very friendly government” in Iraq, however, showed itself to be totally concerned about maximizing its own income (as I expected), and in its most recent auction of right to develop Iraqi oil fields, non-American companies dominated. As an article in the Washington Post (December 13, 2009) pointed out: “Chinese, Russian and European companies won the right this weekend to develop major oil fields in Iraq, while U.S. firms made a paltry showing at auctions that represent the first major incursion of foreign oil companies into Iraq in four decades.” <br />http://tinyurl.com/y8uay4s<br /><br />If this result is considered assisting the US to control Iraqi oil, one wonders what type of evidence could possibly prove otherwise That the United States realizes that the economies of the industrial world depend upon access to Middle East oil to maintain prosperity would seem to be a prime reason why the American establishment has sought to avoid destabilizing wars in that region—and certainly is a fundamental reason why the U.S., so far, has not attacked Iran, as the neocons and the overall Israel lobby desire. <br /><br />As mentioned earlier, my comments that differ with Mr. Wilkinson’s views are not intended to show any displeasure with his excellent review, which is not only favorable but accurately covers the book’s crucial topics.Stephen Sniegoskihttp://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/noreply@blogger.com